By most accounts in the United States and Britain, the integration of the theories and methods of cultural studies to the field of media studies has been swift and far-reaching. This integration has also been recognized as a transatlantic movement, as witnessed in numerous historical reflections provided by American (and American-based) mass communication scholars on how the field encountered and, in different degrees, absorbed British cultural studies (see Carey 1997; Delia 1987; Hardt 1992; Heyer 1988; Levy & Gurevitch 1994). Indeed, over the years, the shift from “mass communication research” to “media studies” – as both epistemological and bibliographic tags – has been an evolution marked indelibly by cultural studies.

Yet media studies and cultural studies are not synonymous, despite their mutual accessibility, shared methods, and common attention to the production and reception of cultural texts and commodities. Each of them arose from a different historical, disciplinary, and intellectual trajectory. The most significant difference lies in the Marxist intervention infused with Continental philosophy (most relevantly the structuralist tradition and its subsequent mutations), which has enabled cultural studies to reconfigure the field of media studies through (a) a repositioning of “mass media” to the critical study of “popular culture” (with special attention to the culture of the “popular class”; (b) an intellectual and political investment in semiology and ideological criticism (of media texts and audiences); (c) a heightening of identity-based media criticism; and as a result, (d) a paradigmatic fragmentation produced – or constructed – between the political-economic critique of the media and cultural studies of the media.

In this chapter, I survey these transformations in the field of media studies in the United States over the past three decades. My contention is that the rapid and successful integration of cultural studies to media studies suggests that mass communication research (especially in the United States) has been aware of, and sufficiently receptive to, media as a political social practice. Indeed it is important to note that prior to the “arrival” of British cultural studies, American media research has already seen a vibrant concern about the political functions and
consequences of media use, a debate that would subsequently be captured in the contrast between so-called “administrative” and “critical” media research. Another important reason why British cultural studies has been successfully adopted is that a strong intellectual current within mass communication theory and research, which has been elegantly articulated in the work of James W. Carey, has already laid the foundation for a “cultural” approach to media and society. Carey’s position has been most closely associated in the field with “American cultural studies.” Toward the end of the chapter, I shall consider some exemplary works in media studies, particularly those concerned with global media culture. These works will be drawn from a non-US context.

The Historical and Intellectual Legacy of Media Studies

We are fast approaching the twentieth anniversary of “Ferment in the Field” (1983), a special issue of the Journal of Communication offering a landmark occasion for a debate over the epistemological forces that had impacted mass communication research in the US. “Ferment in the Field” pointedly assessed the legacy of positivism and neobehaviorism that formed the foundation for much of American mass communication research since the Second World War, and offered a significant alternative paradigm broadly known as “critical theory.” The operating term in that assessment was “alternative,” signaling, interestingly, more of an intention to exhibit a different tradition than a thorough engagement with past traditions. Many of the 35 essays in the issue outlined the challenge of critical Marxist-oriented media research whose central concerns were with the questions of power and control. Here, according to the essay by Jennifer Daryl Slack and Martin Allor, critical scholarship was translated from European Marxism and more specifically critical theory of the Frankfurt School (1983: 208–9), and according to the essay by Dallas Smythe and Tran Van Dinh, from political economy that “requires that there be criticism of the contradictory aspects of the phenomena in their systems context” (1983: 123).

To be sure, “Ferment in the Field” was an occasion for a transatlantic encounter. In the broadest sense, “mass communication” was – and is – the locus of an historical and intellectual encounter between America steeped in the social and political spirit of Progress, Pragmatism, and liberal pluralism and a Europe distinguished by the historical experience of Fascism, exile, fragmentation, and antagonism (Carey 1985, 1991, 1997). The notion of mass media as producing a “democratic order,” securing “consensus,” or even supporting “behavioral determinism,” came under radical suspicion. Thus in many ways, “Ferment in the Field” was more than a challenge to the tradition of American mass communication research; implicitly it was an attack on American nationalism. Yet as many scholars have argued in hindsight, the posture in “Ferment” of polarizing what was famously called the “administrative” versus “critical” studies of mass communication too quickly denied the historicity of the American tradition, as if the very questions of power and control were blind to the practitioners in that tradition. In order to properly see how the theories and methods of cultural studies percolate through “Ferment,” it would be instructive to lay out some of the representative research questions in American mass communication research since the 1940s and those in the alternative paradigm originating in the 1960s from Europe and Britain. I say percolate because what was proposed in “Ferment” as the alternative paradigm only represented one version of cultural studies that was tailored for the discipline of communication, which is not to be confused with the whole intellectual project of cultural studies at large. I shall return to this point later.

Broadly, some of the central research questions examined in, and intellectual inquiry underlying, the American mass communication tradition include: what is the relationship between communication and the organizing process of community? (e.g. Dewey 1927; Bryson 1948; Burke 1945); how does mass communication, particularly the press, commercial advertising, television, and political propaganda, participate in, and alter, the social reality of modernization in the US? (e.g. Enzensberger 1970; Lasswell 1927; McLuhan 1964; Meyrowitz 1985; see also Peters 1989, 1996); what is the science of mass communication, and its methods, that can be quantitatively, rather than speculatively, studied in order to calibrate its social effects, particularly in shaping public opinion? (e.g. Hovland et al. 1949, Schramm 1948, 1949, 1954; Berelson & Janowitz 1950); how is the individual, and more broadly the atomized public, stimulated by the intent of the message of the media producer? (e.g. Lasswell 1948; Klapper 1949); how does the individual utilize mass communication in order to maintain himself or herself as a functioning member of society? (e.g. Wright 1986, Blumler & Katz 1974); how can media research techniques, such as those of radio and advertising, be trained and linked to the professional, and more broadly to the media market? (e.g. Lazarsfeld 1938; Lazarsfeld & Stanton 1949); how does the media, particularly television content, cultivate long-term effects on the audience and society? (e.g. Gerbner et al. 1980; Morgan 1989). In sum, the American mass communication tradition in the period since the 1940s has been a social-scientific enterprise shaped by emerging functional and “practical” research objectives to measure media effects, resulting on the one hand in a professionalization of mass communication research and, on the other hand, in a positivist sociological understanding of mass media (albeit influenced by an interpretive tradition present in the Chicago School of Sociology). Especially from the 1940s to 1960s, the notion of media “criticism” largely involved methodological issues and thus, according to Hanno Hardt (1992), “was bound to threaten creative or innovative modes of inquiry” (p. 122). The behavioral scientific orientation became both the source and result of inquiry, thereby binding the specialization of the field to a “monadic circle” (Hardt, p. 122).

By now, students of media studies are familiar with the encounter between Paul Lazarsfeld and Theodor Adorno in the late 1930s, whose joint but flawed radio research in Princeton funded by the Rockefeller Foundation marked a
major fork on the path of mass communication research. Their encounter would stand in for the divergence of the so-called “administrative” tradition from the “critical” tradition. Lazarsfeld’s 161-page memorandum to Adorno accused him of “disregard of evidence and systematic empirical research” (Lazarsfeld 1938). Adorno, on the other hand, remembered the radio project as being merely interested in reactions within the dominant commercial system, so that “the structure and implications of the system itself are not analyzed” (Adorno 1976: 71). The impact of Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt School who emigrated from Nazi Germany to the United States in the 1940s has been profound, for they imported German Sozialforschung to the American social science research tradition. Their attention was to the historical character of mass culture and to the possible rift between the (individualistic) values posed by the consumption of mass culture on the one hand and sociopolitical reality on the other. Their theoretical formulation was decidedly Marxist. Their key challenge was to the abstracted empiricism of what Max Horkheimer called “the assiduous collecting of facts...the gathering of great masses of detail in connection with problems” present in American social scientific research (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972: 190–1).

Important works in communication studies influenced by this critical tradition of the Frankfurt School have asked two major sets of questions: first, is the industrialization of mass media, with its concentrated ownership and control, desirable for American society? (e.g. Horkheimer and Adorno 1972; Schiller 1989; Smythe 1981; Lowenthal 1984). Second, what is the “emancipatory potential” of public communication when it is recontextualized not only as commercial culture but also as a shared arena of public participation and deliberation, a recontextualization necessitated by the historical experience of totalitarianism? (e.g. Habermas 1979; see also Arendt 1951; Levinas 1989). Overall, the reconfiguration of media studies by critical theory has enriched the theoretical discourse by pressing American communication research to confront the undemocratic character of mass culture, and by extension, to deal with the possible collusion of research with the dominant political and economic system. Broadly put, the transformation from “American mass communication research” to “critical media studies” demanded a radical critique of society and of positivist philosophy and functional, neobehavioral social theory. Such was the collective spirit embodied in “Ferment in the Field,” a spirit that captured the biting philosophical elaboration of the Frankfurt School. Today, almost twenty years later, the field of media studies continues to operate in the shadow of a bifurcated terrain, even as the social-scientific character of research has been thoroughly informed, in different degrees, by the critical neo-Marxian paradigm.

“Ferment in the Field” opened the door for the incorporation of British cultural studies by way of the latter’s intellectual relations with critical theory. Interestingly, however, the neo-Marxist orientation shared by British cultural studies and the Frankfurt School has produced another bifurcated terrain from within, a terrain often marked by the split between cultural studies and political economy. This divergence has often been referred to as the contrast between the attention given to textual matters and audience pleasure on the one hand and the attention given to the production apparatus of the media on the other. The doorway opens into two chambers. The characters and consequences of this division will be discussed in more detail at a later point of this chapter. What is important here is that the absorption of cultural studies into the field of media studies was marked by a distinct, emerging construction of cultural studies in the image of “communication,” and more specifically, in the (crass and mechanistic) image of a production–text–consumption process.

Lawrence Grossberg (1997b) has suggested that “historically and genealogically, the discipline of communication was the site of the first major opening for an obvious and explicit cultural studies project in the United States” (p. 279). Reflecting on the development of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, Stuart Hall (1969–70) also remarks on the de facto perception of the Centre’s work as the site of media studies: “The notion that the Centre, in directing attention to the critical study of ‘contemporary culture’, was essentially to be a centre for the study of television, the mass media and popular arts...though never meeting our sense of the situation...nevertheless came by default, to define us and our work” (qtd. in Grossberg 1997b: 281–2). In addition, many in the field of media studies took Richard Johnson’s essay, “What is Cultural Studies Anyway?” (1986–7), to be the paradigmatic framework for a cultural studies approach to media. Johnson’s essay provides a model of cultural studies that resembles the tripartite focus in conventional communications theory, namely the attention to the separate dimensions of production, textuality, and reception (Grossberg 1997b: 286). As a result, the broader project of cultural studies initiated by Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, and Stuart Hall entered into media studies in the United States by way of a reductivism of “culture” to “communication” (Grossberg 1997b: 282). On the other hand, Grossberg has pointed out that a certain misreading of Hall’s essay “Encoding/Decoding” (1980), and by extension a misreading of Marx’s introduction to Grundrisse, has also contributed to the field’s desire to tailor cultural studies according to the measure of a conventional, often apolitical, model of communication (see ibid., pp. 283–6).

Interestingly, thus, whether by design or by default, the sea-change experienced in the field of media studies in the US over the years pivots on the ambiguous (and admittedly controversial) term “culture.” By this I mean a development of the field that can be witnessed through three “foci” that pivot around “the cultural.” A whole intellectual transformation would move from the notion of “progressive society” (in the US) through that of the “public sphere” (in Europe) to that of “civilization” (in England), and then would be captured under the empire of “culture” (transatlantic). This was the first pivot of the field. The second pivotal change entails the translation between “culture” and “communication” as discussed above. The third would involve
yet another translation: that between “culture” and “ideology.” Correspondingly, the absorption of cultural studies into the field of media studies can be said to operate in a geohistorical plane, a methodological plane, and a theoretical plane all at once. These three levels find the swirling term “culture” to be a common denominator, thereby enabling the hitherto shift from “mass communication research” to “media studies” to continue to mutate into research on “media culture.” I have touched on the first two fulcrums above. Now let me briefly turn to the third one.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, media studies as practiced in the Birmingham Centre and Open University (re)turned to the “repressed,” as it were, through what Stuart Hall (1982) called the “rediscovery of ideology.” At the base of this rediscovery was the dictum that the media did not reflect, but constructed, “reality.” Hall and his colleagues (Tony Bennett, James Curran, Graham Murdock, Janet Woollacott, and others) re-issued the positivistic tradition in media studies for (a) falsely presuming the production of an integral and organic “consensus” by the media and for (b) lacking a sophisticated theory of power. Turning first to the interpretive sociology of Howard Becker, Durkheim, and Weber, they restored the critical concept of “deviance” in a hierarchical society. They incorporated Stephen Lukes’ Power: A Radical View (1975) and Roland Barthes’s work, so as to elaborate a model of consensus creation driven by (mythologized) power. Interestingly, this model would prefigure the Foucauldian moment of contribution, since his model of power too addresses the matter of consensus production. Through these theoretical elaborations, a Marxist framework resting on a specific radical ideological critique was formally introduced to media studies. This ideological critique examined two central questions: “How does the ideological process work and what are its mechanisms? How is ‘the ideological’ to be conceived in relation to other practices within a social formation?” (Hall 1982: 65). The preoccupation was with print and television news, its central problematic was class struggle, and its main philosophical thrust “structural-conjuncturalist” (see Grossberg 1997a: 220f). This ideological critique of the media meshed the diverse theoretical repertoire of Althusser, Gramsci, and Volosinov and outlined a serious intellectual and political commitment to a reconceptualization of “culture” as structural significa­tion, as hegemonic formation, and as a site of (class) struggle. James Curran et al.’s Mass Communication and Society (1977) and Michael Gurevitch et al.’s Culture, Society, and the Media (1982) are two important collections that summarized the ideological position in this newly conceptualized media studies at that time.

Scholars would quickly note the shift in cultural studies from the “culture and society” tradition most closely associated with Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, and E. P. Thompson, to that of “culture and ideology.” In this instance, a “communicational cultural studies” (Grossberg 1997b) is sutured into an “ideological cultural studies.” James W. Carey went on to point out the radical reduction of “culture” to “ideology” in the cultural studies of language, media, work, subcultures, and the whole social formation. According to Carey, this reductivism has drawn considerable “resistance” to cultural studies:

[Resistance to centering the question of ideology or of adopting cultural studies as a point of view toward the mass media is that it seems to commit oneself in advance to a moral evaluation of modern society – American in particular, the Western democracies in general, the mass media above all – that is wholly negative and condemnatory. It seems, therefore, to commit one to a revolutionary line of political action or, at least, a major project of social reconstruction. (Carey 1985: 33)

Here, Carey only associates the ideological critique with the so-called “pessimistic” impulse of cultural studies, and therefore does not foresee the redeployment of ideological critique in later times surrounding reception studies of the media. Still he argues that this resistance to the question of ideology is misplaced, even as it casts a spotlight on a reductivist cultural studies. Even as “culture” is phenomenologically diverse in essence as well as effects, the ideological critique of culture reveals the diminished role of “coercion” in modern life, while the description of the ideological state apparatus points to the displacement of a repressive state apparatus (Carey, p. 36). Above all, Carey argues that to overcome resistance to the ideological critique is to keep open the possibility of a productive comparative dialogue between British and American brands of cultural studies.

Indeed, Carey was the first scholar in communication to seriously integrate the intellectual legacy of British cultural studies to the American context (see Carey 1975, 1983; Grossberg 1997b). As early as the 1950s, his displeasure with communication research and as conducted in the mode of positivistic science led him to propose a cultural studies as an alternative paradigm (see Carey 1985). Carey’s American version of cultural studies used the ideas of Max Weber, John Dewey, Robert Park, C. Cooley, and Kenneth Burke to build a framework consistent with American Progressivism in which modern communication and the media could be usefully situated. Carey also took Raymond Williams’ notion of the “long revolution” seriously, enabling a conceptualization of “culture” as a ceaseless, continuous transformation of economic, political, and community life. Finally, Carey’s project revisited both Chomsky and Althusser, and both Harold Innis and Gramsci, to chart the integrated relations of symbols, rituals, and social structure in “communication.” Too often, contemporary media studies in postpositivist times have not fully ascertained the impact and usefulness of the tradition of American cultural studies. Too often, we fail to acknowledge the structural humanism common to British and American cultural studies. We have yet to re-imagine this common ground as a symbiotic relation.

In the above, I have attempted to chart the historical and intellectual formations responsible for the development of media studies into a critical paradigm informed by cultural studies. I surely do not claim comprehensive coverage. In
addition, I have not made analytical distinctions between diverse media forms, such as news, television, film, radio, advertising. Such distinctions will be alluded to below when I turn to the specific manner in which cultural studies has transformed the field of media studies, namely (a) the shift toward the study of the politics of “popular culture”; (b) the primacy of the ideological critique of texts and audience; (c) the proliferation of “identity politics” in media studies, such as gender politics, racial politics, and sexual politics; and (d) the creation of a perpetual schism developed between political economy and cultural studies.

Media Studies and Cultural Studies: Points of Engagement

In an essay in Nelson and Gaonkar’s (1996) _Disciplinarity and Dissent in Cultural Studies_, Arjun Appadurai observes that the ongoing debates about cultural studies reveal an “overdetermined landscape of anxieties” that he describes as an “omnibus characterization about its ‘theory’ (too French), its topics (too popular), its style (too glitzy), its jargon (too hybrid), its politics (too postcolonial), its constituency (too multicultural)” (p. 30). While Appadurai’s tone is sarcastic, he nonetheless points to the inflated ways by which opponents of cultural studies have caricatured it. Surely, the field of media studies has produced its own resistance to, and caricature of, cultural studies over the years. Perhaps the most aggressive attack seen recently can be found in Ferguson and Golding’s _Cultural Studies in Question_ (1997). It therefore comes as no surprise that in the 1970s, the integration of cultural studies into the field of media studies was largely about a politics of legitimation.

In this section, my purpose is twofold. Besides reviewing the various points of engagement through which cultural studies has redefined the field of media studies, I will also consider how that engagement has increasingly encountered a politics of resentment. Understanding this backlash is today part of the necessary point of engagement from within and without.

*Popular culture without guarantee*

[To imagine that popular culture is *not* “already politics,” is it seems to me, politically disastrous. (Morley 1998: 487)]

The first point of contact between cultural studies and media studies has been about the transformation of mass media studies to the study of the politics of popular culture. Shaped by the general cultural upheaval of the 1960s and the formation of the New Left, British cultural studies saw the terrain of popular culture, or the ordinary, messily culture of everyday life and its flexible sensibilities, as an important site of political and social conflict. Attention to mass media would be shifted to this larger, more politicized, terrain of popular culture. More specifically, it was a shift toward a formal engagement with the high-culture versus low-culture debate (see MacCabe 1986). As early as 1964, Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel argued in *The Popular Arts* that “the struggle between what is good and worthwhile and what is shoddy and debased is not a struggle against the modern forms of communication, but a conflict within these media” (p. 15). Television, music, and cinema continue to be arenas where the distinction between the tasteful and the disdained is marked. Through an assumed equation between popular culture and working-class culture, cultural studies in the 1970s and early 1980s maintained that understanding. The political motivation (the hegemony) that marginalized the “popular class” and the “debased culture” they consumed was a key aspect of a repoliticized media studies.

This politics of legitimation, as I would want to put it, however, produces contradictory effects in media studies. On the one hand, it was a response to the manipulation thesis proposed by, and an orthodox Marxism underlying, the Frankfurt School. The study of popular media becomes legitimate once its “opium effects” are dispelled, as it were. On the other hand, the legitimation impulse spurs a nostalgic idealization of the (precommercial) lost past thought to have formerly belonged to an “authentic” working-class culture. Tony Bennett (1986) calls this a “walking backward into the future” (p. 18), whereby any form of communication consumed by the working class, such as community newspaper and radio, is assumed to prefigure revolution! Integrating Gramsci’s treatment of the “national-popular,” Iain Chambers (1980) proposes a corrective by leaving open the possible articulation and disarticulation between popular culture and working-class culture in a larger political context (especially in Britain) where the “popular” can be (and has been) actively appropriated into the erection of (hegemonic) nationalism. In this respect, the whole subculture debate in England surrounding working-class youth’s relation with popular culture in the 1970s, especially Hall and Jeffresson’s _Resistance Through Rituals_ (1976), Hebdige’s _Subculture_ (1979), Willis’s _Profane Culture_ (1978), and McRobbie’s _Feminism and Youth Culture_ (1991), remains an important opening for looking at the complex and often contradictory negotiations offered by popular cultures.

The theorizing of popular culture thus provides a robust opportunity for rethinking media power in the existing historical and social structure. In production studies of popular music, for instance, it allows for a differentiation of the “gradation” of commercialization between, say, independent local music production and the core music industry dominated by large music companies (see Robinson 1986; Ross & Rose 1994; Shore 1983). Even music charts and market sales are relatively open spaces for negotiating the extent to which commercial music penetrates the public. The bargaining of taste, identity, and affect is of course an active dimension of popular music consumption. The work of Lawrence Grossberg, Simon Frith, and Dick Hebdige, and more recently, of Tricia Rose, Sarah Thornton, Michael Dyson, and George Yúdice, to name only a few, are familiar to us in this regard. Similarly, the study of television daytime dramas and soap operas, which has necessarily intersected with feminist theorizing of
popular media, has seen the balance between celebration and condemnation (let alone campy readings that converge the two) as the hallmark of political ambivalence in the project (see Allen 1995; Grisrud 1995). The examination of media power is therefore reconstructed, to paraphrase Stuart Hall, into a “popularity” without guarantee (see also Bennett et al. 1986; Garafalo 1987; Miller & McHoul 1998; Stallybrass & White 1986; Williamson 1986).

By the early 1990s, popular culture research, courses, and books abounded. Yet the politics of legitimation continues to pervade the field of media studies; the ground has still to be guarded. This is because a certain uncharted auto-celbration of anything popular, the opponents would have it, has gone too far. On the one hand, for them, consumption is forever suspect. On the other hand, theories that support the passion for the popular are seen as offering the new old tricks so reminiscent of the liberal-pluralist ethos that plagued American mass communication research of the past. However, this charge of a “new revisionism” (Curran 1977) in studies of popular culture, it seems, requires fixation on certain examples or figures in cultural studies (e.g. the highly repeatable target of a John Fiske) or a certain disdain of “soft science” (e.g. constructed for feminist ethnographic studies of interpretive communities). The disingenuous spirit arises when the question of historical limits is easily forgotten; attackers of popular culture studies today operate with a willful amnesia about the hard-won space pried open only two decades ago.

The primacy of ideological criticism in media studies

I have stressed above that historically for cultural studies, the key to reconstitute the field of media studies, so that it would be responsive to historical conditions and to mechanisms of social power, has relied on a Gramscian approach. It is important to note that it is not that theories of ideology and hegemony are deployed to supplant that of culture and communication; rather, they provide the necessary scaffolding for building a broader historized articulation of media effects. To this end, cultural studies in the 1970s showed us a key piece of empirically based media research that exemplified the primacy of the ideological critique. It is instructive to briefly revisit Hall et al.’s Policing the Crisis (1978).

A robbery – labeled a mugging – was committed in Handsworth, England, in 1972. The crime excited a massive response from the media, the judicial system, and the public. Although the crime was familiar to London streets from at least the 1860s, the press and the police described it as “a frightening new strain of crime.” In a short time public debates over this “new” crime renewed panic over the moral fabric of the “British way of life,” as well as over an apparent softening or even collapse of British law and order. By 1976, the debates seemed to have condensed around a single effective “origin”: black youth in the inner city. By then, mugging and blacks had become synonymous terms in the public imagination.

The fear surrounding the Handsworth case grew into something much larger, much more menacing; the social control prompted by such fear therefore became much more severe, much more “justifiable.” Taking a skeptical view of this constructed “newness” of such crime, the authors of Policing the Crisis suggest that the analysis of the Handsworth case unearthed a whole terrain of contested forces, shaping the incident from outside, behind the scenes, and linked to a certain hegemonic struggle for the power of the state to step up control, not of crime per se, but of the social group thought to be unmistakably associated with the crime: black youth.

Policing shifts the study of ideology from a transactional model to a structural and historical model; “mugging” is not treated as a fact consumed in the circuit of public communication, but a relation “in terms of the social forces and contradictions accumulating within it... or in terms of the wider historical context in which it occurs” (Hall et al. 1978: viii). The historical issues, they argue, are precisely the “critical forces which produce ‘mugging’ in the specific form in which it appears” (p. 185; emphasis theirs). The Handsworth case therefore illustrates a crystallization of the operation of the media, so that through one case we can observe the shape of the whole news process and its relation to hegemony. The theory of articulation so central to the ideological critique offers a useful method to examine the apparent convergence of the press and the legal institutions in their attempt to maintain the stability and cohesion of society through the (hyper) control of crime and of black youth. Policing therefore discovers a repressed terrain of discourses, attitudes, and practices against blacks, all of which predated the Handsworth case and subsequently structured the way the incident was interpreted and how it was then “appropriately” responded to, contained, and policed.

The implications of the methods and theories used in Policing have been far-reaching. The key shift has been to scrutinize mediated events in their discursive relations as a complex web of information, achieving prominence in the public imagination (“common sense”) and asserting the possibility of altering social policies and realities. The 1988 grisly true-life murder story—the “preppy murder” – for instance, became a major media event and was studied by Charles Acland in his Youth, Murder, Spectacle (1995), for its ideological content about racialized youths and police work. In Unstable Frontiers, Erni (1994) unpacks the media discourse surrounding the “invention” of an AIDS drug (AZT) and explains how its ideological significance lies in a certain rejuvenation of medical authority and management of the deviant body. Examples such as these exemplify the impact of cultural studies’ theories and methods on understanding news. It is obvious that the ideological critique found in these examples is not limited to matters of textuality, contrary to the view of many opponents of cultural studies.

At the same time, this ideological approach somehow overcommits to the notion of “preferred reading” derived by Hall, who never meant to limit reading only to texts. As media studies veered toward the ideological model over the
years, we have also moved from studies of “preferred reading” to the other (autonomous) moments in Hall’s model of media effects, namely the negotiated and oppositional readings of texts and contexts. Hence the continuous growth of audience reception studies in media studies (e.g. Ang 1995; Morley 1986, 1992; Radway 1988; Seiter et al. 1989, to name just a few) and the theoretical revisions underpinning such studies (e.g. Allor 1988; Erni 1989; Grossberg 1997c), which attempt to conceptualize and trace the multiple relations audiences find within the media’s consumptive environment.

Not unlike the politics of legitimation surrounding the study of popular culture, audience studies of the media as conducted in the name of cultural studies have seen their share of disapproval from the intellectual arbiters of the ethnographic tradition (e.g. Ferguson & Golding 1997; see also Nugent & Shore 1997). Some of this objection fails to see the media consumption environment as a distinct social formation, with its own organization of interpretive community, openness of intertext, centrality of gossip and other everyday practices, and so on. The effort to rethink the “field” in fieldwork in media studies has led to the effort to rethink ethnography and its methods. At a time of media consumption in a hyperinformational surrounding, just as cultural studies is facing the task of inventing new methods for studying the users of media, it seems counterproductive to call for a return to more “secure disciplinary foundations” and their “established methodological procedures,” be it anthropology, sociology, or political economy (see Morley 1998).

**Difference, identity, and performativity in media studies**

Since the 1970s, significant scholarship in the field of media studies has focused on the politics of difference—social, signified, discursive differences. Media studies research quickly got organized around a list of identity-based investigations of the way the media represents diverse differences. Correspondingly, various new and established political and intellectual movements articulating diverse identities came to shape specific domains in the field: feminist media studies, media studies of race and ethnicity, queer media studies, national and regional media studies, and so on.

The political and intellectual foci of these studies can be gleaned from the questions they ask, which broadly include: What is an adequate theory of subjugation of marginalized identities? How are identities of different social groups represented in the media, and transformed into non-identity-based discourses (such as those linked to questions of technology, cultural citizenship, nationalism, religion, etc.)? How are cultural representations of subordinated identities linked to material, economic constraints and other mechanisms of control? What is the relationship within, between, and across different identities, and how are they linked to the categories of agency, power, resistance, and performativity? How do we imagine alternative representations? Examples of relevant media studies works are too numerous to cite here.

**Borderlands in media studies: cultural studies and political economy**

The critique of the media from both cultural studies and political economy stems from a shared sense of political struggle. Meanwhile, the division in methods of investigation between the two is sometimes falsely dichotomized. Rather, on the one hand, sophisticated analysis of industrial practices and structures of the media often involves interpretive procedures and a thorough understanding of how capital—be it capital in its Fordist or post-Fordist moments—restructures social, economic, and discursive relations in media practices (e.g. Burnett 1996; Geuens 1999; Gitlin 1986; Hannerz 1996; Sussman 1995). On the other hand, well-grounded studies of media as cultural discourse, including its moments of circulation and consumption, often begin with a thorough survey of the material conditions surrounding, if not constituting, the discourse and its related ideological context, including historical, economic, and policy conditions (e.g. Ang 1995; Daley & James 1998; Gripps ruth 1995; Lewis & Jhally 1998; Miller 1998b; Morley & Robbins 1995; Tullock & Jenkins 1995; Spigel & Curtin 1997). Clearly, communication and media are complex systems with cultural, political, economic, and policy dimensions.

Yet there are real differences. But they cannot be captured in the serial sloganeering of such polarities as concrete versus abstract, plain versus jargonistic, research versus theory, objective versus narcissistic, and so on.
The initial integration of cultural studies into the field of media studies saw an important adjustment of the legacy of orthodox Marxism, especially its “economic determinism” of social life. This adjustment, seen through various attempts to reread Marx’s theory of base and superstructure, was made in a framework and a time preoccupied with class concerns. The role of ideology and language in media culture was ignored by an economic deterministic theory in media studies. At the center of what needed adjustment was the whole way of thinking about media consumers.

First, cultural studies proposed that the assertion of media consumers as “cultural dopes” narcotized by the process of commodification had led to a bankrupt political project, especially for the Left. Cultural studies argued that the social could not be collapsed into the economic. Seen in this way, the shift to the critical study of the politics of popular culture “without guarantee” as well as to an ideological orientation, was to turn our attention to a major blindspot in the political-economic approach. The capitalist media were integrated into social life while people encountered the media, but in ideological conditions not of their own making. Cultural studies suggested that unless this theorizing was taken seriously, communication and media studies would degenerate into a tyranny of political certainty, whereby the logic of commodification would be seen to overwhelmingly define all aspects of our (presumably passive) relations with the media.

Second, cultural studies proposed that media studies needed a more expansive view of the media consumers and media workers beyond their class orientation. Political economy failed to theorize social difference even at a time when Laclau and Mouffe (1985) had called “the surplus of the social.” To take an example, for a long time, political economic analyses of the movie industry only focused on the economic structure of expansion, labor exploitation, and regulatory practices, without recognizing that these dimensions of the industry had differential impact on women and cultural minorities. Even in Douglas Gomery’s (1992) sophisticated study of the history of movie theaters in the US, movie theaters for black Americans and other ethnic groups are separately considered as “alternative operations.” Movie-going practices and the business aspects of the industry are examined under the (easy) assumption of a direct correspondence between the concentration of capital and the reality of a segregated movie-going public. In other words, capital movement and interests unproblematically explain the social reality of segregation in media consumption. Broadly put, the political-economic approach to the media conflates business with history. Cultural studies maintains that “the social” within history is constituted by forces well beyond “the economic.” Even labor issues, being one of the main points of investigation in political economy, are social issues. Even the exploitation of labor in the increasingly integrated, deregulated media industry requires the promotion of a whole social and cultural discourse espousing the ideological virtues of “autonomy,” “local control,” Taylorist “efficiency,” “global downsizing,” and so on.

In recent years, the divergence between cultural studies and political economy has been deepened. I will forgo a rehashing of the battle here. Instead, I share the view of Vincent Mosco, a senior scholar in the political-economic tradition, who summarizes the relation between the two sides with extraordinary lucidity and potential for dialogue. It is worth a lengthy quotation:

[C]ultural studies reminds political economy that the substance of its work, the analysis of communication, is rooted in the needs, goals, conflicts, failures, and accomplishments of ordinary people aiming to make sense of their lives, even as they confront an institutional and symbolic world that is not entirely of their own making and which, in fact, appears more often than not as an alien force outside of their own control. Cultural studies has also contributed to the expansion of critical work beyond class analysis to include research inspired by feminism and those newer social movements committed, for example, to peace and environmentalism. This work has served to remind political economy that, though social class is a central dividing line, or, from the perspective adopted here, a starting point, multiple overlapping hierarchies constitute the process of structuration. Moreover, though its extreme formulations celebrate the politics of contemporary life as a search for particular identities that fragment oppositional politics, cultural studies has recognized the organizing potential of multifaceted forms of social agency, each of which brings with it dimensions of subjectivity and consciousness that are vital to political praxis and which have received too little treatment in political economic analysis. (Mosco 1996: 251–2)

Global Media Studies: Some Recent Works

I would like to work toward a conclusion with a discussion of media studies conducted outside of the US context, particularly in the current hothouse atmosphere of global media studies. In this chapter, I do not claim thorough coverage of the different ways cultural studies has impacted the field of media studies, especially that in different national and regional traditions. Nonetheless, cultural studies, in its current phase of internationalization, has yet to produce an assessment of its reception in contexts other than the US and UK, and other than English-speaking areas. Analysis of global media, it seems, has emerged from all corridors of social sciences as well as from the telecommunication industries. The current enthusiasm surrounding critical global media studies in the English language has come from scholars commenting on the globalization (and various degrees and dimensions of internationalization) of the media from the vantage point of the US, UK, Europe, and Australia (e.g. Downing 1996; Miller 1998a; Shohat & Stam 1994, 1996; Sinclair et al. 1996; Trent 1998). I want to discuss two related works at some length, so as to identify some directions that media and cultural studies seems to be taking today.

By and large, global media studies has proceeded with a common theoretical premise that in the vast space of global capitalism, what identity we have has
increasingly become a question of where and when our identity is situated along the shifting traffic of global media. This argument makes possible a theory of “wired identity” experienced in the transnational trafficking of (dis)orienting images and narratives (see Erni 1996). Crucial to this theory is the configuration and distribution of power in temporal and spatial terms. David Morley and Kevin Robins’ *Spaces of Identity* (1995) and McKenzie Wark’s *Virtual Geography* (1994) represent two important works in cultural studies that, in their own ways, work through the implications of this notion of “wired identity.” Their assessment has effectively destabilized normative, official discourse about the relationships among world territories, especially in light of the aftermath of international events such as the formation of the European Community, the rise of Asian Pacific capitalism, the German reunification, and the creation of NAFTA, GATT, and the WTO. As a result of an emerging postmodern global remapping of the world along lines of telecommunications, which cannot be simply collapsed into lines of capital and wealth, such relationships have to be reassessed. In addition, these two works can be used here to point to two parallel, and somewhat contradictory, impulses within media studies today, increasingly articulated with questions of transnationalism in geographical, political, and cultural terms.

These works connect closely with the large and influential body of critical writing that explores the contours of colonization conceptualized in spatial and temporal terms. Since the 1970s, this growing body of work has been an important voice in the examination of transnational development projects and the globalization of capital and communications. Key texts include, for instance, David Harvey’s *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1989), Henri Lefebvre’s *The Production of Space* (1991), Neil Smith’s *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and Production of Space* (1990), Edward Soja’s *Postmodern Geographies* (1989), Doreen Massey’s *Space, Place and Gender* (1994), and so on. Of course, Edward Said’s important writings, including *Orientalism* (1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), have laid the foundation for a conceptualization of colonization in terms of the imaginary production of the dazzling, exotic space of Orientalism. In addition, the recent renaissance in Canadian critical theory of the important work of Innis attests to the centrality of “critical geography” as a focus of social theory concerned with the power of colonization derived from mobile forms of communication (e.g. see Acland & Buxton 1999). Thus, *Spaces of Identity* and *Virtual Geography* may be properly considered postcolonial media and cultural studies.

Situated in western Europe, Morley and Robins write out of a tradition of British cultural studies that in part has historically been a project about dismantling the hegemony of Western, particularly Eurocentric, systems of knowledge and power. In contrast, Wark sees the world from Sydney, Australia, what he dubs a “simulated America” (p. 14). Sydney cultural studies therefore in part represents a confluence of intellectual responses to the simulation effect, making it quite sensitive to the transnational dynamic of media, culture, and identity (e.g. Turner 1993).

Like Fredric Jameson, Morley and Robins in *Spaces of Identity* reformulate the question of global culture not only in terms of the economic order within which the cultural object takes form but also of the psychic processes that engage in its creation and reception. They attend to the articulation of transnational European culture and identity as a “political unconscious” that erects European supranationalism as a historical, political, and economic regime as well as mediated psychic fantasy. Wark’s *Virtual Geography*, on the other hand, addresses the question of political fantasy in the global media by suggesting that the subjective and objective dimensions of cultural production are effects, not the substance, of globalization. Rather than positing the subject/object designations in cultural relations, Wark focuses on the pathways — what he calls “vectors” via Paul Virilio’s work — that constitute such designations in the first place. Ultimately, the “political unconscious” of global capitalism and transnational cultural production appears as a map of vectorial pathways that consist of mobile lines of economics, distribution of natural and human resources, historical memories, electronic and digital signals, advertising images and sounds, and so on. These mobile vectors thus wire the globe with differential power, setting up an uneven transnational flow of resources, desires, and identities. In sum, Wark postulates that to be a “subject” of culture, to have identity in the global sphere, means finding the coordinates of vectors that form a certain narrative charged with meaning of subjecthood that can only be discerned in topographical, relational terms.

In *Spaces of Identity*, Morley and Robins mark the emergence of the “European Community” or “European Union” in the 1980s as a historical moment of crisis. They argue that this project of forming a trans-European economy has been couched in official terms as a matter of cultural adjustments by people of various local regions: “The new culture of enterprise enlists the enterprise of culture to manufacture differentiated urban or local identities” (p. 37; emphasis added). This agenda, they suggest, is accomplished by sweeping telecommunications initiatives or directives that would link disparate regions and territories into what they call “audiovisual geographies” that are detached from the spaces of national culture, and are realigned “on the basis of the more ‘universal’ principles of international consumer culture” (p. 11). Given the inherent diversity of national cultures and identities across Europe, how can this new media order possibly create social, political, and psychic coherence for the diverse inhabitants of Europe? They ask: “What does the idea of Europe add up to when so many within feel that they are excluded?” (p. 3). According to them, there are two levels of hegemonic exclusion: internal exclusion through the production of “false local cultures and economies” within Europe, and external exclusion through the symbolic demarcation of non-European Others. To cohere, to be “Europe,” thus means the persuasion of a core, “organic” European identity postulated on retrieving “common memories” of nationhood and empire across vast terrains. This is where the media come in.
While Morley and Robins agree that global capitalism has not annihilated all spaces and places (p. 30), they argue that differentiated local identities are manufactured in the media “around the creation of an image, a fabricated and inauthentic identity, a false aura, usually achieved through ‘the recuperation of history’” (p. 37). They take up the intense cultural debate in Europe opened up by Edgar Reitz’s 1984 film, *Heimat*, which was subsequently developed in his sequel *Die Zweite Heimat* (1990). According to Morley and Robins, Reitz’s films served as a lightening-rod for a continental debate all over Europe regarding its future. Through this “German story,” passionate debates about who owned the franchise on the representation of the past coincided with the proliferation of the discourse of the European Union, thereby constituting the ideologically charged notion of the “homeland” as the symbolic condensation point of European identity. Given that in the discourse of European Union, “the longing for home is not an innocent utopia” (p. 90), Morley and Robins provocatively ask: “Can we imagine an identity, an awareness, grounded in the experience of not having a home, or of not having to have a home? Can we see home as a necessarily provisional, always relative, truth?” (p. 103). If *Heimat* is a precarious form of European fundamentalism, the critical issue confronting Europe since the 1980s, the authors assert, is whether it can be open to “the condition and experience of homelessness” (p. 103).

Their conceptual conclusion is this: the European Union accords symbolic coherence to a Europe as an economic, technological, and cultural leader in world affairs. Such a symbolic coherence is achieved by reasserting European modernity as unique compared to the “overdevelopment” of the United States and Japan on one side, and the “underdevelopment” of Islamic countries, Africa, and Central Asia on the other side. Hence, European modernity supplies a happy medium to world civilization in late capitalism. This European order is largely about the serial demarcation of maps and territories, including physical and imaginary or psychic borderlines between Self and Other. Meanings of identity thus reside in the designations of subject/object relations according to economic and cultural power. Morley and Robins see the Eurocentric project as largely regressive and reactionary. In the end, it promotes fear and anxiety more than feelings of unity. In contrast, Wark’s *Virtual Geography* proposes an alternative model of analyzing the phenomenon of globalization that refuses the model of subject/object relations.

Wark’s study, with a subtitle of “Living with Global Media Events,” discusses the question of globalization by theorizing it as a problem about how to experience the media events that link distinct sites and separate time zones in the world. How do we reconcile the dazzlingly confusing situation of watching the Gulf War in 1991 or the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, as something so far and yet so near, so recent yet so remote at the same time? On a daily basis, the high rate of repetition of information, images, historical narratives, recent memory, economic tales, and mediated moralism in these global media events alone can produce such a disorienting effect as to deprive us of rational discourse. How does one live with such a strange mediated experience?

Wark focuses on four recent important global events that have been so thoroughly mediated across vast spaces and time zones as to render their status a function and effect of the movements of media vectors. In fact, he does not call the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Beijing Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, and the “Black Monday” stockmarket crash of 1987 events per se. In the vectorial field, these highly charged international stories are termed “sites,” “intersections,” “lines,” and “noises.” He moves back and forth between “objective” re-reporting of these events and plots the coordinates that link and shape them on the maps of transnational media. He argues that our everyday experience of global media spectacles crucially depends on where and when they are distributed to various sites in the world along established but shifting “power-lines.” These power-lines are the trajectories along which information, technologies, capital, and even warheads can potentially pass. They disrupt the normative distance and temporal relations between different geographical locales. The experience of living with these global media events conceptualized here as media vectors means observing not so much the “events” as such, but the movements of media vectors across geographical and temporal spaces. Watching the Gulf War or the Hong Kong handover, therefore, becomes a kind of concrete abstraction, taking in information and meanings that fall from the sky, integrating them into the constantly shifting (and perpetually revising) local interpretations, and expecting that they will change from day to day and from locale to locale. According to Wark, such is the technomystical reality of living with global media events.

In this way, Wark’s study offers a new way of “doing” media studies that is grounded in the everyday realities of a world remapped by media vectors. Researchers will become postmodern map-makers. How does the mediated, vectorial map of the world today tell the story of uneven development along class, racial, and gender lines that are the objective mainstay of global conditions? Better yet, to adopt a Warkian language, where and when do global media events fix, anchor, and concentrate global power relations so that our everyday experience in this context is both magically surreal yet, at a given time and space, painfully “real”? For every vector that transgresses national and historical lines, there are, in the first and last instance, the material spheres of national and historical structures from which to transgress. There are also all the material, historically determined trappings of mostly economic reality — and economic devastation — that vectors can pass through, but cannot (at least have not) effectively transformed. Throughout his study, Wark has only a tangential discussion of material power in relation to vectoral movements. At best, he has an antimaterialist theory of power. Power is defined only as the problem of access to the vectoral field: “Rapid and effective access to useful information is a vector... Access to these vectors is a form of power, and hence a line along which the struggle in and around events takes place” (p. 18).
Ultimately, in a rapidly globalizing world, we confront the dialectics of the global/universal and the local/particular. Whether it is the question of the European, American, or Japanese utopias or the Middle East or Chinese dystopias, the strong tendency for the telecommunication industry to transport and transgress cultural borders will always have to confront the global–local nexus. Because the media are simultaneously global and local, it becomes critically important for media studies scholars to talk about both the possibilities and limitations of the "wired identity." Morley and Robins’ *Spaces of Identity and Wark’s Virtual Geography* can be treated as a type of media broker, projecting two parallel, but ultimately diverging, views of how the global–local complex of the New World Order transforms the materiality of everyday life in late capitalism.

To conclude, I juxtapose two brief passages from the conclusions of these two recent examples of global media studies to point out, at the risk of simplification, the bewildering difference in their view of the global–local media complex. Wark argues:

Events are in a sense fractal. Each event appears as a confluence of noise in the matrix of vectors, but examine that event on a smaller scale and it appears to be made up of little events, all in a certain sense similar with the bigger event discovered at a larger scale…Hence it seems appropriate to name what can be quite vast and global phenomena after something which takes place in the microscopic scale of electrons, nestling next to each other in a program of immaterial information. (Wark 1994: 228)

On the other hand, Morley and Robins write:

The point is simply that “we” are not all nomadic or fragmented subjectivities, living in the same “postmodern” universe…Many writers have referred to the contemporary dynamic of simultaneous globalisation and localisation. However, for some such people, the globalising aspect of the dynamic is the dominant one, while for others it is very much the localising aspect which is increasingly operative, as their life-chances are gradually reduced, and they increasingly remain stuck in the micro-territories in which they were born. (Morley & Robins 1995: 218)

“Microscopic electrons” of information or “micro-territories” of historical agents? “Immaterial information” or “life chances”? To be certain, these are the points of departure between these two important works. They are also points of political contention for those of us who study the transformation of cultures and identities in the age of global communication. As cultural studies steers between these two poles, it will significantly shape the future practice and politics of media studies.

In this chapter, I have confined my discussion to the most visible lines of inquiry in media and cultural studies in the US. Some important strands have not been addressed, including, for instance, film studies, new (multi)media studies, media and cultural policy research, and the non-English-speaking media studies traditions. My hope is that this map I am sketching will be useful for opening up more work on the histories of media and cultural studies.

Notes

1 I would like to thank Patrick Daley and Vamsee Juluri for their insightful comments on an earlier draft, and Toby Miller for his encouragement.

2 For more recent reflections of the history and trajectory of mass communication research, see the essays collected in these anthologies: Levy and Gurevitch (1994), Hanson and Maxcy (1999), Marris and Thornham (1996).

3 Even Marris and Thornham’s (1996) enormously useful anthology on media studies is explicitly framed by the model of production–text–reception. See their introductory chapter.

4 These transformations are presented here only for heuristic purposes. They are clearly not linear transformations.

5 More recently, Carey has expressed his view of the current proliferation of cultural studies: “I think this is a false prosperity. Intellectually and politically cultural studies is not very healthy and I believe its days are numbered except as an irrelevant outpost in the academy” (1997: 15). Readers are encouraged to read his entire essay to understand Carey’s despair in context.

6 For a recent well-argued, if slightly sardonic, reply to the various forms of attacks on cultural studies, see Morley 1998.

7 Some important examples: feminist media studies (Valdivia 1995; Treichler & Wartella 1986), media studies of race and ethnicity (Gray 1995; Hamamoto 1994), queer media studies (Henderson, forthcoming), national and regional media studies (Chen 1998; Downing 1996; Miller 1996a; Turner 1993). See also other relevant chapters in this volume.

8 Besides browsing through publisher lists, readers interested in sources on a wide variety of identity-based media studies works can visit these useful websites and listserv sites: www.culturalstudies.net; www.cas.usf.edu/communication/rodman/cultstud; www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/cultural; www.eecs.berkeley.edu/gender; www.popcultures.com/internat.htm; www.neumedia.studies.com.

9 See the Media Education Foundation’s website: www.mediaced.org.

10 For a particularly aggressive challenge to cultural studies from the perspective of political economy, see Ferguson & Golding 1997. As for cultural studies’ challenge and reply to the attacks, see Grossberg 1993 and Morley 1998.

11 This last section of the chapter contains a revised portion of a previously published essay. See Erni 1996.

12 In writing about Jameson, Colin MacCabe (1986) suggests that the Jamesonian analysis sees every cultural production as “at its most fundamental level a political fantasy which in contradictory fashion articulates both the actual and potential social relations which constitute individuals within a specific political economy” (p. xi).
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