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Who needs strangers? Un-imagining Hong Kong Chineseness

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As hyper-metropolitan as the city of Hong Kong is, there is strange silence on the subject of strangers. It is not as if encountering strangers has not been the modus operandi of modern living in the hustling and bustling, and often shoulder-rubbing, spaces of movement in the city. Neither is there a general compulsion among city dwellers to bring the stranger closer, by doing something to reduce our feeling of strangeness toward one another. Without interest, fanfare, or malice, the stranger is simply an unmarked, and unremarked, creature. Yet this bland description is only half true.

Increasingly, there is an urgent need to grapple with the politics of stranger-relations in a city that has seen more and more overt conflicts arising from various forms of social dissatisfactions (mostly towards government policies and the wealthy class). Political conflicts with “stranger effects”, if I may say, have evolved from deeply divided value conflicts (e.g., “central” versus “grassroots” values, urban versus rural values, developmental versus preservationist values). The weekly protests and the larger organizing of social dissent surrounding them have produced communities of strangers, whose stranger status is repeatedly fortified by negative media portrayals and moralistic condemnation by government officials. Besides the infamous ubiquitous labeling of youth protesters as the “post-80s generation” (implying recklessness and immaturity), other stranger designations include the disgruntled farmer, the ungrateful welfare recipient, the oafish Mainlander, the unskilled laborer, the guerilla graffiti painter, and the vulgar legislator. A distinguishing characteristic of democratic politics in Hong Kong over the last decade has been the serial production of stranger-identities that are like abrasive patches rubbing against the apparently consensual surface of the social and moral order.

To talk about strangers, like talking about racial and sexual difference, is to enact classifications. While there are too many crossing lines of cultural and political crevices that underline the present proliferation of stranger-identities in Hong Kong, there, in fact, exist two main camps. The object of our pervasive indifference in our common, urban life is most likely the stranger who tends to be silent, private, and acquiescing; while the one whom we notice tends to be the opposite – agitative, demanding, and unforgivingly vocal.

In an effort to pry open a discourse that often underlies the notion of globality, I wish, in this brief essay, to offer a quick glimpse of a political epistemology of the stranger in order to better mark the present time-space of Hong Kong. To mount a
language useful for comprehending how strangers now chance upon one another, keep quiet or vocalize their presence, share a way of being with one another amid difference and indifference, and even combat each other’s values and ideologies in raw street conflicts, we need to consider how the city has been imagined as a particular space of encounter. Over the past few years, I have raised the question of racial minority politics as a specific form of stranger politics that, to my mind, has been under dangerous erasure in Hong Kong. I have been frustrated by a puzzling void amidst the intellectual effort to theorize the “Hong Kong identity” ever since the complicated moment of the “1997 question” led to an unprecedented intellectual preoccupation with what or who was the “local” and what kind of politics of the local would allow the people of Hong Kong to survive in the future. That void is, to put it bluntly, the dearth of attention paid to the role racial and ethnic difference played in the identity politics of the local, either in the historical sense or in the sense of the evolution of identity politics in postcolonial times. In other words, of all the complex demarcations made between “the local” and its political corollary terms – the colonial, the postcolonial, the global, the regional, the national (e.g., Abbas, 1997; Chow, 1998a, 1998b; Chun, 1996; Grant & Tam, 1997; Ku, 2004; Lau, 1997; Wong, 1999) – there has only been short-lived and rather fragile attention paid to the importance of racial and ethnic politics in shaping and transforming the translocal understanding of stranger-relations. It is for these reasons that I think it of paramount importance to reimagine the city anew as a particular space of encountering strangers by actively theorizing the problems of race and ethnicity, everyday racism, and ethnocentric forms and practices of “the local” and, ultimately, “Hong Kong Chineseness” as the taken-for-granted and often invisible center of racial and ethnic belonging.

**Who is a stranger?**

To begin with, the outline of an epistemology of strangers I have in mind requires an understanding of the conceptual field of stranger-relations in general. In considering the conceptual horizon regarding stranger-relations, one cannot move too far afield from Georg Simmel and his interlocutors. While Simmel rarely spoke directly about the category of the stranger in racial or ethnic terms, there is no evidence to suggest that he was oblivious to it. In his enumeration of the various sociological imaginations of the stranger in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, Simmel designates the stranger as someone situated in a unique synthesis of proximity and distance, in what he calls “halfway, unclear relations . . . which have their root in a twilight condition of feeling whose outcome might be hatred almost as easily as love, or whose undifferentiated character is even sometimes betrayed by oscillation between the two” (Simmel, 1971, p. 80; Lingis, 1994). Three brief observations need to be made here. First, there is in Simmel a recognition of the stranger without coupling it with the specter of “otherness”. An uncomplicated coupling of the two arises most strongly after poststructuralist and postcolonial interventions in cultural theory. Second, and related to the first observation, Simmel’s attention is more likely on the material object, presence, and circulation of the stranger-person than on the symbolic, subterranean “stranger effect” espoused, again, after poststructuralist and postcolonial imaginings. His concern is less with “the stranger within” than with the stranger without, the field of relationality between people and groups. Third, based on these two observations, we may derive an understanding of Simmel’s idea about
the stranger as someone “useful” within the sociological imagination. His notion of the stranger as situated in “halfway, unclear relations” in fact gives the stranger unique advantages unavailable to the native, the majority, or the local. As Karakayali (2006) makes clear in drawing upon the sociological examples used in Simmel’s writings, he can derive specific social domains where the activities of the stranger are not only present but positively needed.

For Karakayali, Simmel’s philosophical writings (e.g., Simmel, 1977, 1980, 1990) suggest that strangeness is a “form of interaction” that provides a solution to certain problems at the societal level (2006, p. 314). The problems arising from mundane social interactions are beside the point here. The unique interactional form that is strangeness answers certain social needs, such as the need to mitigate conflicts from a more objective and neutral stance as perceived by the conflicting parties; the need to act as a buffer between the center of power in society and the marginal spaces that power does not want to come close to; and the need (in global times?) to circulate between cultures unattached to the weighty formation of “local identity” or “roots-making”.

Specifically, Karakayali suggests four unique social needs that render a favorable position to the stranger: (1) the need for the trading of goods, information, and money; (2) the need for arbitration and conflict resolution; (3) the need for managing or policing secret or sacred domains; and (4) the need for cleansing society of its impurities (which Karakayali [2006] dubs “dirty jobs”). Briefly, Karakayali argues that, with respect to the strangers’ role as traders throughout the history from preindustrial to industrial societies, they have been able to “weave together elements from and open channels of communication between different worlds” (2006, p. 318). By their ability to circulate, broker, and transfer, they contribute to the translation of cultures, and even of economic and political systems. The primary contemporary examples of this kind of stranger include the broker in a financial market, the interpreter, the foreign consultant, and the visiting lecturer. With respect to the stranger’s role in arbitration and conflict resolution situations, the stranger status evokes the idea of outsiderly neutrality. Simmel (1908) discusses the recruitment of judges from outside in some medieval European city-states, as these outsiders were not bound by root to particular constituencies and did not hold partisan views. In this way, the stranger-as-arbitrator may be the iconic example of the Simmelian dictum of the stranger disposition as being situated between remoteness and involvement. As for the third role of the stranger according to Karakayali – the manager of the secretive and the sacred – the historical resonance here is particularly strong. In both Western and non-Western histories, we find examples of the stranger-as-confidant who not only had access to privileged secrets of a royal palace, a government department, a civic organization, etc., but also exuded certain mystical qualities. To Karakayali’s interesting examples of the alien diviners, witchfinders, and eunuchs, we can add more examples, such as the priest, the police, the nanny, the bodyguard, the web manager, even the garbage handler. This takes us directly to the fourth role of the stranger: someone who is consigned to “dirty jobs”. The image of a stranger handling dirty jobs is an image of a society incapable or unwilling to confront its own impurities. Most likely, this is a discriminatory society whose members mark an untouchable distance from the stranger wedged in society’s repugnant spaces. As a result, “by performing such [dirty] tasks, the stranger him/herself appears as an impure being” (Karakayali, 2006, p. 323). Importantly, Karakayali states:
No doubt, the most paradigmatic example of the stranger in the 20th century has neither been the “trader,” nor the “judge,” nor even the “confidant” but the migrant worker who performs unskilled, manual labor. In fact, today, this image seems to be increasingly replaced by the refugee who is kept in closely scrutinized asylums, or the illegal immigrant who hides in containers in commercial ships or who crosses borders, crawling under barbed wires in the dark. (2006, p. 324)

Yet Karakayali is silent as to the politics of why the contemporary status of the stranger has shifted much more clearly than before to the body of the racialized groups engaging in unwanted and often vile occupations, resulting in disposable and perilous predicaments. Simmel himself, while obviously aware of the diverse racial and ethnic background of the stranger involved in the unique intermediary spaces in and across societies, did not offer a glimpse of the impact race and ethnicity has had on the sociological imagination of stranger-relations.

In sum, in classic sociology, the stranger plays indispensable roles that, uniquely, only they can play. The emphasis is rarely on their presumed negative strangeness but more on the structural in-betweenness that they occupy, and curiously, the power derived from their real and discursive mobilities. The more strangers “float” without laying down roots, forming communities, or establishing permanent relations, the more they are ironically needed by society. Even in the cases of the migrant workers (legal or illegal), it is clear that the state and the entrepreneurial class need them in sectors of the economy in which the natives are either incapable of or unwilling to participate. Interestingly, to return to our concern about the intersection among race and ethnicity, global urbanity, and the concept of the stranger, I should note that the problem of racial or ethnic difference may or may not be a factor that derives from the stranger disposition. Whether and how race or ethnicity, and strangeness are conjoined is a political question of articulation.

This leads me to the next necessary analytical step, that of understanding the empirical background of racial minorities in the context of Hong Kong. It goes without saying that in the history of Hong Kong, non-Chinese groups have flowed in and out of the territory. In the case of the European expatriates, the position of the “happy stranger” has been evident in colonial and mercantile arrangements. Under colonial rule, the presence of the white strangers occupying more privileged government and economic positions was mandated. As for the non-European immigrants and sojourners coming into or passing through Hong Kong, they are by a majority South and Southeast Asians, such as Filipinos, Indians, Pakistanis, Indonesians, Nepalese, and Thais (see Table 1). They can be circumscribed within Simmel’s framework of strangers in mixed and varied ways, for some of these dark-skinned Asians have been in relatively favorable positions of traders, interpreters, judges, and teachers (Kwok & Narain, 2003; White, 1994), while others have been largely abandoned strangers trapped in a socially isolated, sub-economic existence (Ku, Chan, & Sandhu, 2006; Sung, 2005; Tam, Ku, & Kong, 2005). A detailed historical analysis of what may be called stranger differentiation – especially between white expatriates and the unprivileged ethnic minorities – may be of interest, but it is not the concern of this brief reflection. Rather my main concern is limited to the South Asian minorities and how they are constructed, subordinated, and often made invisible through the dominant discursive preoccupation with Hong Kong Chineseness (Lo, 2008; Sautman, 2006).
A “raceless” global city

What social and discursive forms do racialized strangers in Hong Kong take, given the city’s preoccupation with, and defense of, Hong Kong Chineseness? How is racism here different from that of the colonial power? These blunt questions are not to claim Hong Kong Chineseness particularism. Han racism existed long before China’s (and Hong Kong’s) encounter with the West and other Asian diasporic people. In reviewing Han racism, Kuan-hsing Chen (2010) points to three discursive and psychic strategies by which Han Chinese dealt with the ethnic other: demonization (guihua), animalization, and creating ever finer distinctions and hierarchies (pp. 260–261). I do not deny the possible applicability of these strategies in the social context of Hong Kong (and, for that matter, to other globally-oriented Chinese cities, such as Singapore, Shanghai, and Taipei), but I propose that we join the effort underway in deconstructing the hegemonic culturalist sentiments in the construction and self-construction of “Chineseness” (e.g., what Ien Ang [2001] famously calls the “prison-house of Chineseness”; see also Chun, 1996). More focally, I propose, along with Kwame Anthony Appiah, that in Hong Kong, Chineseness operates powerfully within a moral imperative of what can be called a hegemonic model of family solidarity. Appiah (2005) has this to say about racism:

> Intrinsic racism is, at least sometimes, a metaphorical extension of the moral priority of one’s family; it might, therefore, be suggested that a defense of intrinsic racism could proceed along the same lines as a defense of family relations as a center of moral interest. (p. 393)

He goes on to say, “I suggested that intrinsic racism had tended in our own time to be the natural expression of feelings of community, and this is, of course, one of the reasons why we are not inclined to call it racist” (p. 395). I suspect that the so-called mild forms of racial strangerliness admitted to by local Chinese – as uttered in the common dictum: “We are not racist. Hong Kong has not seen racial violence and hatred at all. We know about their hardship but our system takes good enough care of...”

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Table 1. “Ethnic minorities” population in Hong Kong, 2001 and 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>2001 Number</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>2006 Number</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>6 364 439</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>6 522 148</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipinos</td>
<td>142 556</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>112 453</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesians</td>
<td>50 494</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>87 840</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>46 584</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>36 384</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>18 543</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>20 444</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepalese</td>
<td>12 564</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>15 950</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>14 180</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>13 189</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thais</td>
<td>14 342</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>11 900</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>11 017</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>11 111</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asians</td>
<td>12 835</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12 663</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>20 835</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>20 264</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6 708 389</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>6 864 346</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Population Census (2001) and By-census (2006), Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR.
them” – stems from intrinsic racism or, more accurately, “racialism”. Racialism, extending typically from the dubious appeal to family, marks a sense of “family solidarity” among people of the same racial and ethnic background, thereby creating taken-for-granted forms of stranger-construction for those who are not “family”. There is evidence that this culturalist sentiment of unity is most strongly evident is the ability to speak Hong Kong Cantonese fluently (Li, 2006). It is therefore not surprising that a major criterion by which one proves one’s belonging is the mastery of Cantonese in an “accurate” local accent (hence the exclusionary attitude toward Mainlanders who, even in speaking Cantonese, reveal traces of a “wrong” accent).

To take the question of race and ethnicity seriously as a problem in understanding the politics of strangers and of family solidarity in a global city like Hong Kong would require a book-length investigation of the multiple facets of racialization in the city’s everyday life. This is beyond the scope of this paper. In order to form a basic picture that can usefully open up knowledge about racialized strangers, I will simply mention two significant kinds of cultural politics that shed light on the subject.

First, Hong Kong is a “raceless” global city because of the historical amnesia it suffers: a forgetting of the fact that although the unprivileged ethnic minorities constitute only around 5% of the total population, they build distinctive communities, practice unique and diverse customs, and make a considerable contribution to the economic development of Hong Kong society. The persistent consignment of these minorities to menial occupations, in welfare discourse, and increasingly in episodes of crime, has contributed to a callous erasure of their presence, except in moments of social panic and moral wrath. But more importantly, I argue that this erasure produces, and is produced by, a constant lack of social discourse about race and racism, whether in schools, at home, or in the media. Instead, what is generally taken for granted is the social significance attached to, and the celebration bestowed upon, the local “family” notion of the “Hong Konger”. Around and after 1997, the defense of this notion reached a feverish peak, and once again, the intense preoccupation with constructing and defending the family notion of the Hong Konger enacted a complete forgetting that, precisely at that conjuncture, the unprivileged ethnic minority communities in Hong Kong had to face the imminent threat of becoming stateless due to ambiguous abandonment by both the British and the Chinese.

Compared to other globally-oriented Chinese cities, Hong Kong seems to have suffered an historical amnesia of the racial other more strongly than other globally-oriented Chinese cities. In present day Singapore, for instance, recognition of multi-ethnic communities remains strong, even as multicultural policies continue to privilege the interests of the dominant Chinese nation-state (Chua, 2003; Ho, 2009). In Taiwan, the aboriginal movement has, over the past decade, forced the government to take responsibility for social reform and positive steps for a revitalization of aboriginal cultures (Taipei City Government, 2004; Tsao, 2001). In recent years, within the PRC, news about increasingly strained ethnic conflicts between Han Chinese and minority groups such as the Huis, Uyghurs, and Tibetans has kept alive a public consciousness about ethnic political struggle (Caprioni, 2011; Dikotter, 2010). From these examples, we can see that a fragile racial consciousness continues to plague Hong Kong, rendering its claim to global-city status questionable. Second, Hong Kong as a raceless, global city has also emerged out of a near total abandonment of the teaching of the subjects of race and racism in either public or family educational domains. Never has serious attention been devoted to the study of
these subjects in Hong Kong’s education system. In other words, generations of Hong Kong people have been educationally blind to the existence of racial inequalities. Questions of colonialism, immigration, or refugee politics are all too easily muted as mere administrative and economic matters. Again, race or multicultural education pales in Hong Kong when compared to other Chinese societies. For instance, Ho (2009) examines the Singapore national social studies curriculum and documents how it has shifted from an exclusive focus on a nation-centric paradigm to one that is more globally oriented in nature, while still being firmly anchored to the nation-state and its priorities. Liu and Li (2007) talk about government initiatives in Taiwan to cultivate the teaching of aboriginal cultures in schools; and in Baranovitch’s (2010) examination of Chinese history textbooks in the PRC, he suggests that as ideologically fraught as they are, those textbooks have made possible “the incorporation of non-Han peoples into the Chinese historical subject” (p. 85).

Finally, in Hong Kong, the silence on the subjects of race and racism extends to the academic community. With only a small handful of exceptions, the record of academic research in these areas has been dismal. Most of the by-now common (some say stale) theorizations of stranger politics made elsewhere – such as the theories of hybridity, new ethnicities, heteroglossia, transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, to name the usual suspects in theory-speak – have rarely been a part of the intellectual project of reimagining Hong Kong at its current postcolonial and hyper-globalized conjuncture. And when they are part of that project, again there has been a strong tendency to narrowly focus on the struggle of the “Hong Kong identity” as an internal, self-distinguished, and utterly raceless category.

It is time to combat cultural complacency oriented toward a dubious racialist appeal to family solidarity. As Kuan-hsing Chen (2010) put it succinctly, “I think the supposedly heated debate on Chineseness is not nearly hot enough. It has not reached the heart of the matter: universal chauvinism” (p. 266). Debates over the cultural politics of the racialized strangers constitute a major intellectual and political frontier in Hong Kong.

Notes
1. This list should supplement the more “normalized” inventory of social and political dissenters also found in Hong Kong politics, such as women, racial minorities, immigrants, queers, and the “June 4” protestors.
2. Along with my colleague Lisa Leung, I have been involved in an ongoing research project since 2008, which is uniquely situated in Hong Kong, concerning the active role played by Hong Kong’s South Asian minority communities in shaping their own “creative survival” in the face of direct and subtle forms of racist discrimination experienced in the media, schooling, and the law. Not until we began this research did we discover the paucity of sustained cultural research on the subject. Lisa Leung and I are now preparing a book that attempts to cover the social, historical, cultural, and legal dimensions of South Asian lives in Hong Kong. I have also begun to offer an undergraduate course devoted exclusively to the study of ethnic minority culture and politics. The course, to my knowledge, is the only one in the territory to date.
3. One such moment of social panic and moral indignation that arose in recent times was embedded in the outcry in Hong Kong toward the Philippines’ mishandling of a hostage crisis in August 2010 that resulted in the death of eight Hong Kong people. My interest in
brining this up here is not to discuss the tragic consequence of the admittedly problematic episode of police rescue practice in the Philippines; instead, I wish to mark the difficulty of having a different conversation in Hong Kong about this hostage crisis, which confronts the racial hostility of many Hong Kong people toward the entire Filipino race that emerged from the crisis.

4. As 1997 approached, a fervent discussion was sparked over future citizenship issues for Hong Kong’s residents. While most of Hong Kong’s Chinese residents would become citizens of China (via HKSAR citizenship) on 1 July 1997, what would be the fate of its non-Chinese residents? In itself, this problem was not an issue for the few thousand British and other foreign expatriates, since they could remain residents under Chinese rule, as foreigners whose right to continue to live in Hong Kong would be derived not through their foreign passports but through their Hong Kong identity card. However, considerable insecurity arose among the unprivileged ethnic minority population whose right of abode would lapse on 30 June 1997 without being replaced by Chinese nationality. In other words, these several thousand people of different ethnic backgrounds would effectively become stateless at the time of the transfer. This critical issue finally attracted the attention of the legal community, the press, and local scholars. Finally, it was realized that this group of residents had been experiencing all forms of inequitable and discriminatory treatment. Britain denied that it had abandoned them, claiming that such persons remained “British nationals” through the conferment of British Overseas Nationals (BNO) status on them. However, this new BNO status did not carry with it the right of abode in Britain; it only promised British consular protection, and there had already been problems over its recognition by other countries. On the other hand, China showed no inclination to expel the ethnic minorities, nor did it take positive measures to guarantee their right of abode. For instance, China refused to recognize the BNO passports; it saw them merely as travel documents. As a result, the mid-1990s saw the rise of racial consciousness among a small group of legal scholars. For more discussion, see Menski (1995) and Sautman (1995).

5. See, for example, Lilley (2001) for a discussion of rampant ignorance and racism in the anthropology class she taught in a liberal arts university in Hong Kong.

6. The exceptions are the works of Lo Kwai-cheung, Ku Hok-bun, Barry Sautman, Nicole Constables, Lisa Leung, and myself.

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